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Introduction
It is almost two decades since the reforms known 
as ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ radically decentralised the 
administration of New Zealand primary schools. 
Designed to improve the responsiveness, accountability 
and community control of schools, the success or 
otherwise of these administrative reforms has not 
been formally evaluated. Meanwhile, expectations of 
what schools should deliver have changed markedly, 
with policy makers increasingly concerned with 
reducing educational disparity. This concern has led 
to Parliament’s education and science select committee 
announcing in May 2006 that it will hold an inquiry 
into ‘making the schooling system work for every 
child’. The Education Review Offi ce (ERO) – which is 
responsible for reviewing school effectiveness – is also 
currently including ‘the extent to which … [schools 
are] providing a good education for those for whom the 
system is not working’ in its reviews of schools. 
If policy makers are serious about addressing student 
underachievement, perhaps it is time to examine the 
governance of our primary schools.1 Although there are 
many factors affecting student achievement, logically it 
can be argued that improving the quality of governance 
should improve school effectiveness.  
This article examines evidence for the effectiveness of 
primary school boards of trustees and suggests how 
governance may be improved in the interests of reducing 
educational disparity and raising overall student 
achievement. The article is based on recent research by 
the author (Springford, 2005).2
A brief background
Around half a million children are involved in primary 
schooling, which is compulsory from the age of six. Although 
New Zealand has high rates of student achievement, it also 
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has one of the widest gaps in the OECD between the 
highest and lowest achieving students.3
In 1989 the Tomorrow’s Schools reforms decentralised 
primary school administration, from highly centralised 
control by ten education boards to over 2,000 boards 
of trustees controlling individual schools. New 
Zealand primary schools are relatively small, with the 
median school size being 150–199 students. The same 
governance structure is used for schools as small as 
nine students in remote rural localities as for the largest 
schools of over 1,000 students, despite widely varying 
needs and pools of potential trustees. The predominantly 
parent-run boards of trustees are responsible for setting 
the strategic direction and values of each school, and rely 
on the professional expertise of the school management 
for advice and to implement their decisions. 
Boards of primary schools comprise between three 
and seven (commonly fi ve) parent trustees elected by 
school parents, plus the school principal and a staff 
trustee elected by the school staff. The accountability of 
boards to the government and their local communities 
is expressed in the school charter.
Elections for boards of trustees are mostly held every three 
1 Primary schools include full primary schools (years 1–8), contributing 
primary schools (years 1–6) and intermediate schools (years 7–8). 
These are both state and state integrated schools, including those 
kura kaupapa which cater for year 1–year 8 students.
2 I would like to thank Scott Metcalfe, Jonathan Boston, Liz Gordon, 
Cathy Wylie, Daniel Bulman, Andrew Ladley and Sunniva Zoete-
West who commented on earlier drafts of this article. I would also 
like to acknowledge the generous help from the staff of the Ministry 
of Education, the Education Review Offi ce, Multi Serve and the New 
Zealand School Trustees Association, Michael Mintrom, Amanda Wolf 
and Deborah Laurs, especially with the original research paper.
3 International studies like the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) have significantly influenced government 
expectations of the school system. The 2000 literacy results for 15 
year olds showed that the average level of literacy achievement 
was high, but New Zealand had an unusually long ‘tail’ of 
underachievement. These 15 year olds had between one and three 
years of secondary school, with their main literacy development 
occurring in the fi rst eight years of schooling at primary school.
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
3 
20
06
33
years, although some boards also have mid-term elections. 
Almost anyone can stand as a trustee to represent the 
school community, but in practice trustees over-represent 
New Zealand European students and under-represent 
students from other ethnic groups. Over half of parent 
trustees on primary school boards were newly elected in 
2004. For most trustees this is their third job, competing 
for time with paid work and parenting commitments, 
and averaging three hours a week. 
How effective are primary school 
boards of trustees?
Many factors affect student achievement – the student’s 
natural ability, family influence, early childhood 
experience, effectiveness of teaching, principal leadership, 
school governance and the external resourcing of the 
school. It is diffi cult to isolate the impact of school 
governance. Even evaluating the performance of primary 
schools by measuring the difference the school makes 
to student achievement, between school entry (usually 
at age fi ve) and the end of year 6 or 8 when students 
go to the next stage of schooling, is impossible because 
of the current lack of uniform, comprehensive student 
achievement information across primary schools.
Instead, this article examines the effectiveness of board 
governance in terms of the expected role for boards 
within current government expectations of the school 
sector. Those expectations are that:
• Effective teachers work in partnership with students’ 
families, recognise students as individuals with 
diverse needs and respond with appropriate teaching 
strategies. 
• The principal is responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the school. 
• Boards ensure that their schools are quality providers 
through evidence-based planning centred on student 
learning needs, a robust self-review programme and 
an effective principal performance system.
• The Ministry of Education monitors schools and 
quickly identifi es and supports any boards which 
are struggling with their role. 
• In the rare situation where ERO fi nds a school is 
not meeting expectations, the ministry ensures swift 
support to reduce the educational risks for students.4 
Boards of trustees appear to have substantial 
responsibility for raising student achievement and 
reducing educational disparity. Boards are expected 
by the government to set and monitor the strategic 
direction of the school, based on student learning 
needs and in consultation with their communities. 
To this end, they employ school staff and approve the 
school budget. Accountability to both the government 
and local community underpins these responsibilities. 
These aspects of board effectiveness are examined in 
turn,5 beginning with evidence of overall school and 
board effectiveness from ERO review reports. 
1. ERO review reports
Evidence for assessing the overall effectiveness of schools 
and their boards comes from regular ERO review reports. 
When ERO decides that the school is failing to meet 
4 Drawn in part from the following ministry documents: The Schooling 
Strategy 2005–2010, Statement of Intent 2005–2010, Quality 
Teaching for Diverse Students in Schooling: Best Evidence 
Synthesis and Working in Partnership 2004–2007. 
5 The board’s fi nancial role is not discussed, as the government is 
currently reviewing school operation funding, with a report expected 
by 31 October 2006.
Figure 1: Primary schools reviewed by ERO in 2004/05, including current and future 
supplementary reviews (to scale) 
53+53=106
schools with
supplementary reviews
81 ‘new problems’
53
‘continuing
problems’
53 ‘fi xed’
723 total primary schools 
reviewed by ERO 2004/05
53+53=106
schools needing future supplementary reviews
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student learning needs6 or that the safety of students 
is at risk, a supplementary review is scheduled. Such 
follow-up visits usually occur within 12 months.7 
The aggregated data from ERO review reports suggest 
that one in fi ve primary schools are under-performing 
(with half of these having persisting difficulties), 
and that the frequency of supplementary reviews is 
increasing. More specifi cally:
• 18.5% of primary schools were identifi ed by ERO 
in 2004/05 as being of suffi cient concern to warrant 
a supplementary review within 12 months. 
• Half of the boards that had a supplementary review 
in 2004/05 (due to previously identified poor 
performance) were not able to ‘fi x’ their school prior 
to ERO’s return (usually one year later).8 
• The proportion of schools requiring closer monitoring 
through supplementary reviews has steadily grown 
in recent years, from 14% in 2002/03 to 19 % in 
2004/05.9 
The data also echo the fi ndings of earlier research on 
the greater vulnerability of schools that are small, low 
decile, rural or have a higher proportion of Mäori 
students, (ERO, 1998; Connelly, 1998). The rate of 
supplementary reviews in 2004/05 for decile 1 and 2 
schools (those with the lowest socio-economic status) 
was four and a half times that for decile 9 and 10 
schools. Similarly, ‘very small’ schools (with fewer than 
50 students) were four times more likely than ‘large’ 
schools (over 250 students) to need a supplementary 
review. Some 38% of students in schools identifi ed as 
poorly performing in 2004/05 were Mäori, yet Mäori 
students comprised just 23% of the total primary 
student population at 1 July 2005. 
As well as ‘snapshot’ data from schools reviewed in 
any year, aggregated ERO review data can give a 
longitudinal view of students’ educational environment 
as they move through their primary years. This shows 
similar school performance problems, with adverse 
effects for students. For instance, 38% of full primary 
schools attended by the cohort of children starting 
as new entrants in 1996 came under supplementary 
or special review during the children’s eight years of 
primary schooling.10
The evidence from ERO reviews if anything understates 
the extent of poor performance because of the following 
limitations: 
• Schools are reviewed on average every three years. 
This is potentially a long time in the education of a 
child (who is at primary school for six or eight years 
or at intermediate for only two years) and can mean 
a signifi cant delay in identifying a decline in school 
performance, which may adversely affect particular 
children.
• Such reviews provide only a ‘snapshot’ in the life of 
the school. Schools are notifi ed of a review about 
a month in advance of visits by ERO offi cers, and 
these visits last from two to eight days. However, 
ERO does look at the school’s documentation, 
including policy documents and the school’s records 
of student achievement, before the on-site phase of 
the review.
• ERO relies to some extent on boards’ ability to self-
review through the board assurance statement (BAS) 
and the self-audit checklist, yet evidence discussed 
later in this article suggests that trustee self-awareness 
may be limited.
• ERO does not report on other agencies in the school 
sector, which may be better placed to infl uence some 
aspects of school effectiveness than individual boards.
2. Planning, monitoring and reporting
Boards have been increasingly encouraged to focus 
on raising student achievement. These requirements 
have existed for some time, with the fi rst national 
administration guidelines (NAGs) in 1993 requiring 
6 Some students may still experience effective teaching in a school 
under supplementary review, just as a school on ERO’s regular 
review cycle may have classes where teaching is ineffective.
7 The Picot report, which ushered in the Tomorrow’s Schools reforms, 
recommended reviewing all schools every two years. The current 
offi cial expectation is that schools are reviewed three years, and 
ERO has increased the frequency of its regular reviews from an 
average of three years and four months in 2004/05 to an average 
of three years in 2005/06. The goal suggests an incentive to reduce 
the rate of supplementary reviews. ERO’s decision to schedule a 
supplementary review is based on its confi dence in the board to 
remedy problems identifi ed in the regular review.
8 This pattern of ERO needing to undertake subsequent repeat 
supplementary visits was also noted by ERO five years ago, 
when 45% of schools having supplementary reviews did not meet 
requirements in that subsequent review (Clothier, 2001).
9 The increase may be partly due to the bedding in of both changes 
in expectations through the Education Standards Act and ERO’s 
new approach to school reviews.
10 The overall proportion of students in these 475 poorly performing 
schools will be less than 38% of the primary school population, as 
full primary schools tend to be smaller schools.
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boards, through school management, to identify and 
address barriers to student achievement. The 1999 
NAGs, which took effect from July 2000, required 
that boards address the needs of students at risk of 
underachievement, consult with and report to their 
communities, and develop strategic plans.
The most recent development, the Education Standards 
Act 2001, strengthened the requirement for school boards 
– ‘like the government departments but with considerably 
fewer resources’ (Smelt, 1998) – to plan, monitor and 
report in order to reduce disparity and raise student 
achievement. Boards had almost a year after enactment 
– during which time they received ministry-funded 
training and support – before beginning implementation 
for 2003. From 2004 boards have been required to give 
the ministry a copy of their school charter and an analysis 
of student outcomes against annual targets. 
Planning and monitoring a school’s strategic direction 
based on student learning needs requires complex skills. 
Primary school trustees need to be capable of robust 
self-review, to be able to critique aggregated student 
achievement data, to consult effectively, to base principal 
performance expectations and school resourcing on 
strategic priorities, to effectively monitor progress and 
to take appropriate action as good employers if progress 
is inadequate. Yet evidence suggests that trustee capacity 
for planning and reporting was still developing. When 
the New Zealand Council for Educational Research 
(NZCER) conducted its periodic survey of primary 
trustees in term two of 2003,11 boards should have had 
their charter and fi rst set of annual targets in place, having 
analysed their student learning needs and consulted with 
their communities. Boards would also have been getting 
reports, over an agreed timeframe, on how well the targets 
were being met. However, only 55% of trustees reported 
that they had student achievement data in all areas to use 
for 2003 achievement targets. In other words, around 
half of boards had not been able to organise their schools 
in time to implement the new planning and reporting 
requirements in their school, although the ministry fi gures 
for 2004 show that 89% of primary boards did submit 
charters. According to the survey, many trustees had not 
shifted their focus from the traditional parent committee 
priorities of property, fund-raising and school fi nances to 
student learning outcomes. 
Given that submitting the annual charter was a clear legal 
requirement for boards under the Education Standards 
Act 2001, and that both monitoring at-risk students and 
strategic planning had been requirements since 2000, 
the fi gure of one out of ten schools failing to submit 
charters in 2004 seems high. 
Further, more than half of the boards in the NZCER 
survey did not fulfi l the Act’s requirements to focus 
with their communities on student achievement by 
consulting over ‘strategic planning/charter’. Similarly, 
half of the two-thirds of trustees who felt their school 
had an identifi able Mäori community had not consulted 
with their Mäori community in the past year. Trustees 
were mostly unaware of their failures to meet legislative 
requirements for consultation: when asked if there were 
any issues for the board around community consultation, 
two-thirds said ‘no’ and just 17% said ‘yes’. 
Worryingly, a study in 2002 of school board chairpersons 
in South Auckland reported that only two of 16 
chairpersons were able to interpret accurately their 
school’s student achievement reports. However, 
on average the same chairperson group rated their 
confi dence in their ability to interpret the data as seven 
out of ten.12 Trustee capacity ‘has been assumed rather 
than systematically developed, and the result is, that 
in the most disadvantaged communities at least, lay 
governors struggle to perform the governance role that 
was envisaged’ (Robinson et al., 2003). 
In terms of robust self-review – necessary for effective 
strategic planning – trustees’ perceptions of their 
performance as recorded in the NZCER survey seem 
to be much more positive than the reality indicated by 
the survey results. The similarly high rates of positive 
relationships reported gives the impression that boards 
use quality of relationships as the indicator that they are 
fulfi lling expectations. 
3. Employer role
Boards appear uncomfortable with their employer role. 
Where possible, employer responsibilities are delegated to 
the principal as day-to-day manager of the school, and the 
11 The NZCER survey data are now three years old and the trustee 
response was 50% (albeit from 69% of surveyed schools, which 
were a representative selection of New Zealand primary schools as 
a whole), but the revealed attitudes and practices are suffi ciently at 
odds with government direction over the years to cast serious doubt 
on board effectiveness in meeting current expectations.
12 The study is of interest because of what it suggests about boards 
of trustees’ capacity, rather than about South Auckland schools in 
particular. Since this study, the Otara Boards’ Forum now supports 
a number of South Auckland schools.
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board’s role is to receive reports that these responsibilities 
have been met. With the tasks of principal appointment 
and appraisal, where delegation to the principal is not 
possible, most boards contract outside expertise to help. 
Using outside expertise and delegating to the principal is 
prudent, but the extent of delegation and outsourcing does 
raise questions about the effi ciency and appropriateness 
of boards of trustees being employers. Brooking’s 2002 
study of principal appointments also showed that too 
often boards struggled with their task of appointing the 
best-suited person. That 19% of schools reviewed in 
2004/05 were judged to be poorly performing further 
raises doubts about boards’ ability to use the principal 
performance management process to ensure that their 
school is a quality provider. 
4. Relationship with the government
A key assumption of the Tomorrow’s Schools reforms is 
that boards will be accountable to the government. Just 
as there can be diffi culties with the model of voluntary 
organisations as agents of the government (Cribb, 2005), 
the evidence from the NZCER survey in 2003 suggests that 
trustee perceptions of accountability to the government 
are quite weak. Of the trustees responding to that survey, 
around a quarter each felt responsible to the government, 
to the ministry and to ERO. If around three-quarters of 
trustees in primary schools do not feel responsible to the 
government, this must have signifi cant implications for the 
successful implementation of any school sector policies. 
The only partial success, at least initially, of the Education 
Standards Act planning and reporting requirements, 
apparent from the NZCER survey, demonstrates that there 
are problems with trustees’ understanding of, and capacity 
to implement, the government requirements.
Research by Robinson and colleagues (2003) implied 
that schools tend to develop their own expectations and 
ways of doing things that are very much locally driven. 
And ‘locally driven’ means not so much by the wider 
school community of parents, but by the school staff and 
the trustees, past and present. This local school ‘culture’ 
may override boards’ responsiveness to government 
requirements and expectations.
The extent of decentralisation under Tomorrow’s 
Schools creates challenges for the government in 
communicating required changes, let alone ensuring 
effective implementation of them.13 When the ministry 
needs to communicate required school changes through 
boards of trustees, the circulars and booklets have to 
reach the board chairperson and the board agenda, 
and be understood and accepted by both trustees and 
the school staff. At every stage of this long chain of 
communication there is a potential for breakdown or 
misunderstanding. This may partly explain an increasing 
trend for agencies to work directly with schools (Wylie, 
2002).
Boards also appear to be relying increasingly on income 
from school donations, fund-raising and foreign, fee-
paying students. A government review of school operation 
funding will be completed by 31 October 2006. However, 
if trustees believe the government cannot be relied upon 
to fund their school adequately, this may affect their sense 
of accountability. Trustees will not necessarily share the 
ethos of New Zealand’s public service. 
5. Relationship with community
Although ensuring that New Zealand has a school 
system that works for all students is a government 
priority, the self-governing nature of schools is not on 
the policy agenda: the school board model is not open 
for debate. This suggests, perhaps, that the strongest 
reason for the continued government commitment to 
Tomorrow’s Schools is the democratic–populist ethos 
(Fiske and Ladd, 2000), which assumes that local 
communities should have a real voice in their school.
Newport (2000) used the phrase ‘parent power’ to 
encapsulate the uniqueness of the Tomorrow’s Schools 
reforms. Yet parent communities appear to be relatively 
powerless in their theoretical partnerships with boards 
of trustees. The option of moving their children to 
another school is limited for some families and comes 
with costs for others. The board of trustee model in 
practice appears to be not particularly democratic, and 
sections of school communities seem to be disengaged. 
Issues include:
• Low electoral participation. During the last round 
of board elections in 2004, almost half of primary 
schools had insufficient candidates standing to 
require a voting election. Thirteen per cent had 
fewer candidates than positions on the board. 
Where elections were held, the number of candidates 
13 John Martin’s description of contracting under the 1993 health 
reforms as a ‘long chain of accountability’ appears to apply equally 
to the decentralisation under Tomorrow’s Schools (Martin, lecture 
to Victoria University Masters of Public Policy students, 2003). 
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standing for election was still small, with, on average, 
around two more candidates than positions. If 
Hamilton trustee elections are typical of voting 
patterns, then in the half of schools that actually 
hold elections, perhaps only a quarter of parents 
elect their boards of trustees.14
• Limited sense of responsibility to the community. 
Of the trustees who responded to the NZCER’s 
2003 survey, less than three-quarters felt responsible 
to their students, less than half felt responsible to 
parents, and just over a quarter felt responsible to 
the community. 
• Inadequate consultation with the community over 
strategic direction, as previously mentioned.
• Increasing parental complaints to ERO and calls 
for an alternative agency to hear individual family 
complaints about schools.15
Clarence Beeby provided the ultimate justifi cation for 
a community voice in schools when he quoted James 
Shelley from 1921: ‘You tell me the aims of life and I’ll 
tell you the aims of education’ (Beeby, 1992, p.300). In 
other words, education concerns all aspects of life, which 
the community represents. In the Tomorrow’s Schools 
reforms, David Lange sought to create a structure 
that was ‘capable of change in response to what was 
happening in the wider community’, because of concern 
about the rigidity of the education administration in the 
1980s (Lange, 1992, p.43). It may be time to explore, 
however, whether there are more effective ways of 
ensuring community voice at school level.
Summary
If reducing educational disparity is a priority for policy 
makers, then the current governance model needs scrutiny. 
Although certainly not the only factor influencing 
student achievement, boards are currently expected to 
have a substantial role in reducing disparity. Yet the 
available evidence suggests that too many boards are 
having diffi culty fulfi lling their responsibilities. In order 
to meet expectations, boards need fi rstly to accept their 
responsibilities, and secondly to understand and employ 
current good practice. Current government expectations 
imply a high level of managerial skills on the part of 
trustees for boards to govern effectively; publications 
to advise trustees require high literacy levels; and much 
of the training and support provided relies on boards’ 
ability to self-review and recognise need. Primary school 
boards appear to have made a shaky start to meeting the 
strengthened legal requirements to plan strategically. 
They also appear uncomfortable with their employer role. 
Finally, the dual accountability to the government and the 
local community that underpins the current governance 
model appears more theoretical than real.
Future directions
There are at least three possible directions for the 
future: continue with the self-governing school 
model, but strengthen support for at-risk boards of 
trustees; implement a completely different structure 
for administering schools; or pilot new governance 
arrangements and evaluate their effectiveness.
Option 1: Better support for boards of 
trustees
This option would involve enhanced early detection 
of and then support for at-risk boards. This would 
build on current structures. The ministry could, for 
instance, aim to double both its detection rate of at-risk 
primary boards and schools, and the rate of statutory 
intervention. 
Option 2: An alternative administration 
structure
A second possibility would be the creation of formalised 
school clusters. For example, approximately 200 
ministry-designated geographic clusters of primary 
schools could be established, each one under the 
oversight of a ministry-appointed cluster principal. 
Features of such a governance system could include:
• the continuation of many of the current freedoms 
of individual primary schools (such as teacher and 
support staff appointments, budget-setting and 
property management);
14 An analysis of election return data for parent trustees for schools 
in Hamilton during the 2004 elections indicates that voting turnouts 
(participation rates) for primary schools were on average 18–28% of 
potential voters (results compiled by G. Kitto from data published in 
the Waikato Times; personal email, 1 November 2005). This contrasts 
with the 82% voting turnout for the Hamilton East and Hamilton West 
seats in the September 2005 parliamentary election.
15 Although two extra staff to act as advocates for young people in 
the education system were appointed to the offi ce of the children’s 
commissioner around fi ve years ago, there have been a number of 
calls for an alternative agency to hear individual family complaints 
about schools, for example an education ombudsman, or a legal 
review agency.
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• the cluster principal having responsibility for the 
appointment, support and development of each 
school principal;
• the cluster principal having responsibility for ensuring 
that each school’s strategic direction was developed in 
consultation with its community, and was based on 
valid and reliable student achievement data; 
• instead of school boards of trustees, each local 
school community having the option (depending on 
community interest) of electing one or two parents 
to form an advisory group for the cluster principal 
to consult; 
• students and their families having a chain of appeal, 
starting with the local school principal, then the 
cluster principal, and fi nally a highly visible appeal 
authority within the ministry.
Option 3: Piloting an alternative administra-
tion structure
A third possibility would be to establish a series of clusters 
(as above) on a pilot basis and evaluate their effectiveness. 
Poorly performing schools or areas would be the priority 
for inclusion in such clusters, but it would also be 
important to include a representative sample of primary 
schools. The measure of success would be whether the 
cluster approach was more effective in raising overall 
student achievement, particularly for students at risk of 
underachievement. The model could be extended to all 
primary schools if found to be successful.
Such options will need further analysis, including 
examining overseas experience with clustering and 
comparative data relevant to New Zealand’s current 
approach. Clearly, the effectiveness and effi ciency of 
more intensifi ed support and intervention (option 1) 
should be assessed against alternatives for primary school 
administration. However, the available evidence certainly 
suggests that intensifi ed early detection and support in 
itself might be insuffi cient, for a number of reasons.
The 12–15% of schools identifi ed in the ministry’s 
Statement of Intent 2005–2010 as at risk (primary and 
secondary), and thus open to possible action, is at odds 
with the 19% of primary schools identifi ed by ERO in 
2004/05 as poorly performing. There is a real risk that the 
ministry may be reaching only around half of the boards 
that need support. The low rate of statutory intervention 
seems to indicate that the ministry is underestimating the 
seriousness of an adverse ERO report;16 and that both 
the ministry and ERO are overestimating the ability of 
boards to ‘fi x’ schools on their own, given that only half 
were able to do so within a year.
Further, aspects of adverse ERO reports are not the 
only indicators that the ministry uses to identify at-risk 
boards through its schools monitoring system.
And while the ministry funds four main regional training 
providers for school boards, and various School Trustees 
Association services, none of these support contracts have 
been formally evaluated. In addition, the self-governing 
nature of school boards means that almost all support of 
this kind relies on trustees recognising their own needs. 
Both the NZCER survey results and other literature 
indicate that board self-awareness is not high.
On the other hand, formalising the cluster approach 
(either option 2 or option 3) might mean only minimal 
change in practice for those working in the primary 
school sector, as many support services for schools are 
currently provided at a cluster level. Formalising clusters 
could make it easier for school management to focus on 
student achievement, by allowing for greater effi ciency 
and support in areas such as professional development, 
pooling relief teachers and property support.
Whatever the preferred option, it will be essential that 
any change to the future administration of primary 
schools is evidence-based. As well as literature on 
overseas administrative systems, significant New 
Zealand research will become available over the next 12 
months to help fi ne-tune the way forward: the education 
and science select committee inquiry into ‘making the 
schooling system work for every child’; ERO’s reporting 
on ‘the extent to which the school is providing a good 
education for those for whom the system is not working’; 
the government review of school operation funding; the 
next NZCER survey of primary trustees in early 2007; 
and the next Best Evidence Synthesis on Leadership 
report in June 2007. The level of community support 
and capacity for the current board of trustees model 
could be ascertained by evaluating voter turnout and 
16  Intervention under part 7A of the Education Act – by the minister of 
education or the secretary for education – ranges from asking boards 
to supply information to replacing a board with a commissioner. 
A limited statutory manager to take over some of the board’s 
responsibilities for up to two years is the mechanism most commonly 
used. In 2005, 4.7% of primary school boards experienced statutory 
interventions, with the use of 64 limited statutory managers and 28 
commissioners. 
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candidate availability during the next trustee elections 
in early 2007. There is also considerable potential to 
get a better picture of board functioning with existing 
data by matching ERO reports, ministry support and 
intervention and trustee uptake of voluntary training.
In the meantime, the detection of and support for at-risk 
and poorly performing boards by ERO and the ministry 
can and should be intensifi ed, so that students are not put 
at risk because they are in schools that do not become part 
of any clustering should such options be pursued. 
Conclusion
This article suggests that, given current government 
expectations, and evidence of ineffectiveness and limited 
community voice, an unquestioned commitment to the 
current board of trustees model for all primary schools 
puts a signifi cant proportion of New Zealand children at 
risk of failing to achieve their learning potential. While the 
most pressing priority is quickly detecting and supporting 
all at-risk schools and their boards, the real challenge is to 
fi nd the right scale of administration of primary schools, 
and a system that is evidence-based and can better deliver 
high achievement and high equity outcomes. 
I would like to acknowledge everyone, both paid and 
voluntary, working in the school sector and doing their 
best to make Tomorrow’s Schools work for our children. 
I hope this article can be part of a dialogue as we look 
for evidence of what will reduce educational disparity. 
There seems to be a consensus in New Zealand that we 
want all children to get a good education, regardless 
of where in the country they are, which school they 
are at or whose classroom they are in. In the face of 
potential widespread environmental, economic and 
societal change, it seems more important than ever that 
all children achieve their potential.
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